Partial insolvency in leasing contracts may entail to afford additional late payment costs. In this paper we focus on the case that the lessee makes partial payments in due time and settles the debt augumented by the late payment interests later. The presence of the extra-costs drives the lease Effective Annual interest Rate (EAR) to deviate from the lease contract rate. The aim of this work is to illustrate how design the contract payback amortization to stick EAR to the lease contract rate, when the lease contract rate, the late payment rate and the contract term are exogeneously fixed. First we achieve a proxy for EAR given by the lease contract rate plus an extra-charge rate addendum. We show that this latter addendum is sensitive to the payback Macaulay Duration, a weighted size and timing average. Specifically, the longer the Macaulay Duration, the smaller the extra-charge rate addendum. As a consequence, two general rules to drive EAR close to the lease contract rate roll out, specifically: (1) the payment pattern should be set with a long Macaulay Duration; and (2) the surrender value of the leased good should be put large. As the contract settlement is given, we show that EAR is delimited by a lower bound and an upper bound. Then the payback amortizations with fixed instalments are studied. To get insight on the importance of EAR inputs we roll sensitivity analysis out through illustrative applications. The results of the paper are useful to provide policymakers a better knowledge about the effects on EAR of the contract conditions on the pattern of payments.
Introduction
An evergreen issue in designing leasing contract conditions is to keep the Effective Annual interest Rate (EAR) under control in the presence of extra-costs. In recent times the question has become even more pressing due to a growing number of insolvencies of payments by debtors. Consequently, the need to monitor the cost of credit plays a significant role so that it is kept below some interest rate caps on loans imposed also by the legislation of various countries (see Maimbo & Gallegos, 2014 , Migliavacca et al., 2018 . The main reason for using interest caps on loans is to protect consumers from excessive interest rates, to increase access to finance and to make loans more affordable.
Within this policy framework, this article analyses the extra-costs effects on EAR when the lessee is partially insolvent and the contract interest rate, the late payment rate and the contract term are exogeneously fixed at the beginning of the contract. We get insights on the link between the cashflow pattern and the EAR under lessee's partial insolvency. Our main result concerns to show that the Macaulay Duration (Macaulay, 1938) a weighted size and timing average, can be used as a worthwhile sensitivity measure of the effects of extra-costs on EAR.
Designing leasing contract conditions that allow to move EAR -all else being equal -is a key issue in developing contract conditions on the pattern of payments (see Carretta & Nicolini, 2009; Quattrocchio et al., 2018) . A general rule comes out: to stick EAR to the contract lease rate the Macaulay Duration should be set long.
We also carry out a number of simulations to assess the robustness of our results and to stress test for different types of patterns of contractual payments characterized by different Macaulay Durations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is set up. In Section 3 we study the impact on EAR of the payment payback settlement. In Section 4 we study the case of the payment of fixed payments and the possible option of the payment of the surrender value at the contract terminal date. Section 5 presents our results through simulations and discusses the outcomes of several sensitivity checks. Section 6 concludes the note. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Notation and Layout of the Model
We lay out the notation used throughout the paper. Let
•
A be the leased amount, that is to be intended as the sum of the good price plus the initial costs needed to settle the contract;
• i be the annual compound lease contract rate;
• n be the number of installments of the contract. To explanatory purposes we assume that the installments are annually paid and so, n coincides with the contract terminal date;
• 0 s R ≥ be the payment due at the date s, with 1,..., s n =
. Each s R is given by the sum of the capital share and the interest share;
• E with 0 E ≥ be the surrender value of the leased good to be paid at the date n in addition to the last payment n R so that the payments s R , • m be the late payment annual interest rate. Usually the annual late payment interest rate is given as a nominal annual interest rate convertible the same number of times of the installments in a year. Without loss of generality, we can indicate with m the periodical compound interest rate with the same period of installments dates where, in this paper, the period is the year.
We assume that contract expires at the date n, when the lessee pays the last installment plus the unpaid amounts augumented by the late payment interests and the surrender value if provided for by the contract.
The basic contract conditions are assumed to hold, see for example Brealey et al. (2014) . In the following we will give a guide to select to proper payback amortization in order to move EAR toward an appropriate target value.
By definition the Net Present Value (NPV) at the lease contract rate i of the contract is null ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Where x is the annual interest rate used for discounting. 
A Measure of the Spread between EAR and the Contract Lease Rate
Now we are ready to formulate an EAR proxy.
Result 1. An "extra-charge rate addendum"
A proxy of EAR is given by the sum of lease contract rate i plus an "extra-charge rate addendum"
is the present value at the lease contract rate i of the lump-sum due at the contract term n if no payments are made before;
( 
is the Macaulay Duration of the contract payback discounted at the lease contract rate i. The Macaulay Duration is a well-established and practical concept in finance literature (see Macaulay, 1938; de La Grandville, 2003) and permits to summarizes, in a single time number, the relevant characteristics of contract payments (size and timing).
The term 
where ... stands for the absolute value operator. See the proof in Appendix B.
The Impact of the Pattern of Payments on EAR
The choice of the contract payback settlement plays a crucial role in the determining the late extra-charges. As intuition suggests if "small payments come first and large payments come later", in the event of partial insolvency, the late payment costs turn low because the late payment costs are computed for small amounts, although for long periods. Under this payback schedule, EAR is expected to be close to the contract lease rate i.
Vice versa if "large payments come first and small payments come later", the late payment costs are expected to be expensive, because the late payment costs are referred to large amounts and computed for long periods. In such circumstances EAR is expected to be significantly divergent from the contract lease rate i.
The Macaulay Duration D of the contract payback, where 1 D n ≤ ≤ allows to formalize the above intuitive reasoning. D achieves its minimum and maximum when the payment streams are concentrated in a lump-sum at the extreme dates, more precisely:
is achieved if the payment payback provides a lump-sum at the time 1, i.e. the payment stream is ( ) By properly choosing the payback schedule we can drive EAR in (3.1) to approach or diverge from the contract lease rate.
Result 2. The Macaulay Duration as a sensitivity measure of the lease contract rate and EAR spread
Let the contract period n be fixed and the contract payments s R , with 1,..., s n = and the surrender value E satisfy the closure condition (1), then
• the more "the small payments come first and the large payments come later", the more the Macaulay Duration D goes long and the more EAR approaches to the contract rate i;
• the more "the large payments come first and the small payments come later", the more Macaulay Duration D goes short and the more EAR diverges from the contract rate i.
See Appendix C.1 and C.2 for the proofs.
A way to complain the condition "the small payments come first and the large payments come later" is to provide the payment stream s R with 1,..., s n = increasing in size. A further strategy is to provide for a large surrender value E to be paid at the date n. In fact, a large payment at the terminal date n reduces the payments 
The proof follows from Result 2.
Strategies to Design Leasing Contract Conditions to Meet the Appropriate EAR Target
Designing leasing contract conditions that allow to move EAR toward an appropriate target is a key issue in developing contract conditions. Cheap late payment charges (i.e. m i < ) may incentive the lessee to delay payments; whereas expensive late payment extra-costs (i.e. m i > ) may induce the lessee to turn down the contract. Therefore, if m i < we expect that the policyholder be wishing to design contract conditions able to push EAR up; vice versa, if m i > to push EAR down. In the both cases, the policyholder is expected to be willing to set EAR as close as possible to the contract rate i. ijbm.ccsenet.org International Journal of Business and Management Vol. 14, No. 11; 2019 Result 4. How designing contracts to move EAR close to the contract rate Let the contract payments s R with 1,..., s n = be regularly paid in fixed percentage ρ with 0 1 ρ ≤ ≤ and the outstanding debt overcharged with the late payment interests and the surrender value E be settled through a lump-sum payment at the contract term n. Let the lease contract rate i, the late payment rate m and the contract term n be exogenously given. A strategy to reduce the absolute value ε of the extra-charge addendum is to make the Macaulay Duration D long.
If the contract expiration date n is fixed, the only way to prolong the Macaulay Duration D is to properly set the payment stream s R with 1,..., s n = and the surrender value E. A sufficient way to achieve this target is
• to set the contract payments s R with 1,..., s n = increasing in amount and,
• if the contract provides for the surrender value E, set this value large. As it has been already discussed, 
Fixed Installments
Let the leased amount A be paid back through the payment of fixed installments at the dates 1, 2,.., s n =
.
We separately consider the option of a zero-price and positive-price surrender value.
Zero-Price Surrender Value
Let the surrender value be 0 E = . According to the French amortization, the fixed instalments 
see Dierkes and Ortmann (2015) . Formula (5) shows that 0 E D = is independent on the leased amount A and the installment R. As a consequence, the Macaulay Duration 0 E D = is uniquely determinated by the contract interest rate i and the contract term n.
Positive-Price Surrender Value
Let E be the surrender value with 0 E ≥ . The fixed installment becomes
where R is the fixed payment in (6) 
where 0 E D = is defined in (5), see Appendix D for the proof.
It is worthwhile noting that the Macaulay Duration D in (6) depends on the leased amount A and the surrender value E. Therefore, (5) 
The exact EAR value solves the equation
A proxy of EAR is given by formula (3.1) and follows We are ready now to illustrate the main strategies to drive EAR close to the contract interest rate i.
Result 5. Fixed payments: how designing contracts to move EAR close to the contract rate
Let the fixed contract payments be regularly paid in fixed percentage ρ with 0 1 ρ ≤ ≤ and the outstanding debt overcharged with the late payment interests be settled through a lump-sum payment at the contract terminal date n in addition to the surrender value 0 E ≥ . Let the lease contract rate i, the late payment rate m and the contract term n be exogenously given.
If the surrender value E increases, then EAR goes up if the late payment rate m is cheap (i.e. m i < ), and EAR goes down if the late payment rate m is expensive (i.e. m i > ).
Numerical Illustrative Examples
This section sheds light on how the payback pattern may differently impact on EAR.
Throughout this Section we assume that the leased amount is 150, 000 A = , the annual compound lease contract rate is 5.087% i = , the annual compound late payment rate is 7.719% m = and the installments are monthly paid.
To highlight the key drivers in determining EAR, we consider contracts with fixed installments and surrender value E, with 0 E ≥ to be paid at the contract term. Note that we consider the case m i > . To ascertain the impact of the Macaulay Duration on EAR we set a number of illustrative examples. Vol. 14, No. 11; 2019 
Conclusion
Delays in payment incur extra-costs that make the lease EAR to deviate from the lease contract rate. Motivated by the practical need to design leasing contracts that keep EAR under control, because of the presence in Italian and European law to kept below some interest rate caps on loans, in this paper we assume that the lease contract rate i, the late payment rate m and the contract term be exogenously given. First we formalize the condition "the small installments come first and the large installments come later": in the event of partial insolvency, extra-costs are limited, because they are referred to small amounts, and EAR remains stick to the contract lease rate i. Vice versa if "the large installments come first and the small installments come later" EAR diverges from the contract lease rate i.
We provide two general rules for the payback settlement able to make EAR close to the contract rate: (1) to set the payback settlement Macaulay Duration long; and (2) to set a large surrender value. A sufficient condition to achieve the former goal is to set the payments increasing in amount.
In the case of fixed payments, the formulae become simpler but the advices to make EAR stick to the contract rate remain the same.
To make evidence of our results we roll sensitivity analysis out through numerical examples. The results of the paper are useful to provide policymakers a better knowledge about the effects of the allocation the payback amounts over the contract life. 
By (2) 
Since by construction, x with respect to x at x i = .
• By the NPV formula (2) we calculate 
• By the NPV formula (2) we calculate In conclusion the more postponed the payments, the longer the Macaulay Duration; and the sooner the payments, the shorter the Macaulay Duration.
Appendix C.2 The influence of Macaulay Duration on EAR
Let us calculate (3.1.1) for the modified stream in (C.1):
The extra-charge addendum defined in (3.1) is given by Dierkes and Ortmann (2015) . Note that 0 E D = is independent of the amount R of the fixed instalment and the leased amount A.
The Macaulay Duration of the payment stream in the presence of E with 0 E ≥ becomes (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
Appendix E. Fixed installments: EAR
The extra-charge rate addendum is given by (3.2):
